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FORCIBLE DETAINER IN KENTUCKY UNDER THE
UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND
TENANT ACT
Forcible detainer is the statutory procedure which enables
a landlord to recover possession of rental premises from a ten-
ant.' While this action in Kentucky has evolved from an Eng-
lish criminal proceeding, it is not a common law action. Rather,
forcible detainer is a special statutory procedure in derogation
of the common law2 which was developed specifically to meet
the needs of lessors.3 The action has traditionally been sum-
mary in nature, limited solely to the issue of which party was
entitled to possession.4 The entire proceeding, from complaint
to "eviction," may be completed in as few as six days.' Thus,
although there are other possessory actions available to a land-
lord, forcible detainer is, as a practical matter, the only such
remedy that is used.
For the attorney who does not regularly work in the area
of landlord-tenant law, it may be expedient to have, at the very
least, a working knowledge of the forcible detainer action. For
instance, many tenants seek legal assistance only after they
have been served with a writ of forcible detainer. Similarly,
many landlords, especially those who rent under oral agree-
' Ky. REv. STAT. § 383.200(3)(a) (1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. A tenant is
entitled to bring possessory actions in certain situations, but he may not bring a
forcible detainer proceeding. Mattingly's Ex'r v. Brents, 159 S.W. 1157, 1160 (Ky.
1913); see KRS § 383.200. Despite the nomenclature, the procedure is appropriate
where the tenant is holding wrongfully or unlawfully; the tenant's continued possession
need not involve force. Newson v. Damron, 193 S.W.2d 643, 644 (Ky. 1946).
2 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer § 4 (1961); Glenn, Forcible Detainer in
Kentucky, 34 Ky. S.B.J., No. 3 at 27 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Glenn]; McHugh v.
Knippert, 243 S.W.2d 654, 655 (Ky. 1951). See also Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S.
363 (1974).
2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 250 at 372.126 (P. Rohan ed. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as POWELL].
See, e.g., Johnson v. Haynes, 330 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1959).
2 Compare KRS § 383.210 (1) (three days notice prior to hearing) with KRS §
383.245 (warrant of restitution may be issued on third day after judgment).
6 See 2 POWELL, supra note 3, 250 at 372.126. Other possessory actions, such as
ejectment, are comparatively slow, complex and expensive. Id. Furthermore, an unsuc-
cessful forcible detainer action does not bar the subsequent use of a different action.
Glenn, supra note 2, at 30-31; Johnson v. Haynes, 330 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1959).
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ments, seek legal advice to enable them to recover possession
only after a serious dispute has developed with a tenant. Thus,
an understanding of forcible detainer, which is one of the most
important aspects of this area of the law, is necessary for any
attorney who is likely to have contact with landlord-tenant
problems.
Already the primary method of recovering possession of
rental premises, forcible detainer takes on increased signifi-
cance under the recently enacted Uniform Residential Land-
lord and Tenant Act,7 [hereinafter referred to as the Uniform
Act]. Under this Act, an "action for possession" is the only
method by which the landlord can recover possession of rental
premises which the tenant will not voluntarily relinquish.'
Thus, under a tenancy governed by the Uniform Act,' forcible
detainer may be the only practical means for a landlord to
dispossess an unwilling tenant.
The Uniform Act does not directly change Kentucky's for-
cible detainer procedure.'" However, in addition to increasing
the importance of the action, the Uniform Act effects substan-
tive changes in traditional landlord-tenant law" which will sig-
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, KRS §§ 383.505-.715 (1974
Supp.) [hereinafter cited as URLTA].
Compare URLTA, KRS § 383.690 with URLTA, KRS § 383.695(4). If the land-
lord unlawfully removes or excludes the tenant from the premises, the tenant may
recover possession and is entitled to recover damages not exceeding three months' rent
plus attorney's fees. URLTA, KRS § 383.655. The purpose of the forcible detainer
proceeding is to prevent breaches of the peace that may result if the landlord attempts
to evict the tenant by force. Cuyler v. Estis, 64 S.W. 673 (Ky. 1901). Nonetheless, the
common law rule in Kentucky permitted a landlord to recover possession in some
circumstances without resort to legal process. See Stoll Oil Ref. Co. v. Pierce, 337
S.W.2d 263 (Ky. 1960).
1 The Uniform Act governs only residential tenancies. URLTA, KRS § 383.530.
At present, the Act applies only to Jefferson and Fayette Counties. URLTA, KRS §
383.715(1). As to residential arrangements that are specifically excluded from the
coverage of the Uniform Act see URLTA, KRS § 383.535.
,0 However, the provisions of the Uniform Act indicate that the landlord may join
his claim for possession with a claim for back rent. See URLTA, KRS § 383.685.
Likewise, the provisions indicate that the tenant may counterclaim for damages in any
forcible detainer action. See URLTA, KRS § 383.545(1). But see UJRLTA, KRS §§
383.645(1)-(2).
" For discussions of traditional landlord-tenant law, see 2 POWELL, supra note 3,
220-260; Gibbons, Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: A Survey of Modern Prob-
lems with Reference to the Proposed Model Code, 21 HAST. L.J. 369 (1970); Hicks, The
Contractual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443 (1972); Quinn and
Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant, 38 FORD. L. REv. 225 (1969); Special Project,
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nificantly affect forcible detainer proceedings. Thus, it be-
comes appropriate to examine the entire forcible detainer pro-
cedure in light of these changes. This comment, then, will ex-
amine three aspects of forcible detainer in Kentucky under the
Uniform Act: (1) the forcible detainer procedure, (2) the cir-
cumstances that may lead to forcible detainer action by the
landlord, and, (3) the defenses available to the tenant.
I. THE FORCIBLE DETAINER PROCEDURE 2
Original jurisdiction of all actions under the Uniform Act
is given to quarterly courts in Kentucky. 13 Accordingly, a forci-
ble detainer proceeding for a tenancy governed by the Act is
initiated by the landlord's complaint'4 to a quarterly court
judge. 5 When the complaint is made, the judge issues a war-
rant to an authorized sheriff or constable, directing the officer
to notify the defendant tenant of the charge.'" This notice must
be served at least three days in advance of the hearing date. A
tenant who has not received adequate notice has a right to a
continuance, and no action can be taken against a tenant who
has not been notified at all.'7 Adequacy of notice, however, does
Developments in Contemporary Landlord-Tenant Law, 26 VAND. L. REv. 691 (1973).
See also Report, Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 8 REAL PROP.
PROB. & Ta. J. 104 (1973); Strum, Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act: A Departure from Traditional Concepts, 8 REAL PROP. PROB. & Ta. J. 495 (1973).
12 Forcible detainer is a special statutory action. The statutory procedures are
exclusive; the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply. Glenn, supra note 2,
at 30.
The Kentucky Legislative Research Commission is presently studying the existing
forcible detainer procedure, and it is likely that certain changes will be proposed in
the 1976 General Assembly.
13 URLTA, KRS § 383.540.
,1 According to prevailing practice, this complaint need not be in writing. Simi-
larly, no written response is required. Glenn, supra note 2, at 29. Query whether this
practice will be continued with the additional issues and affirmative defenses that may
now be raised in a forcible detainer proceeding under the Uniform Act.
,1 Compare URLTA, KRS § 383.540 with KRS § 383.210(1). The author of this
comment was informed by members of the Kentucky Legislative Research Commission
that the intention was to give quarterly courts exclusive original jurisdiction of forcible
detainer actions under the Uniform Act.
,6 KRS § 383.210(1).
,7 KRS § 383.215. One legal commentator has further suggested that default judg-
ments, as such, are never authorized in forcible detainer actions; the landlord must
always prove his allegation that the tenant is forcibly detaining the premises. Glenn,
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not necessarily require personal receipt by the tenant. Notice
given to a member of the tenant's family over 16 years of age
or even notice posted on the door of the premises is sufficient.,'
This notice requirement is apprently satisfied by taking steps
that are "reasonably calculated to inform.""5
At the hearing before the quarterly court, either party has
the right to demand a jury trial; however, unless specifically
requested, the right is waived. 20 Virtually all forcible detainer
proceedings in the past have been tried by the judge sitting
without a jury. There are two possible explanations for this.
First, it is likely that many tenants and landlords have been
unaware of the right to a jury trial in this type of proceeding. 21
Secondly, due to the summary nature of the proceeding, in
many cases impaneling a jury was merely a waste of time. With
supra note 2, at 29-30. Mr. Glenn makes this assertion on the basis of KRS § 383.235
(verdict to be made "after hearing the evidence . . . .") and language in KRS §§
383.235, 383.245 (forcible detainer described as an "inquest" or "inquisition"). See also
Jolly v. Gilbert, 226 S.W. 354, 355 (Ky. 1920) (proof of refusal to surrender possession
upon demand required to authorize judgment). Mr. Glenn reasons that:
[a]s an action of forcible detainer is a special statutory proceeding. . . in
derogation of the common law, the statute conferring jurisdiction must be
strictly pursued in the method of procedure prescribed by it or jurisdiction
will fail to attach and the proceeding will be void.
Glenn, supra note 2, at 28-29.
This argument, however, was raised and rejected by a federal district court which
held, inter alia, that despite the special statutory character of the forcible detainer
proceedings in Kentucky, default judgments are authorized; the court is not required
to inquire into the merits of the case when-the tenant does not make an appearance.
Branham v. Malone, 367 F. Supp. 370, 372 (W.D. Ky. 1973). Apparently, default
judgments have been issued in forcible detainer actions by courts in Kentucky. See
Bledsoe v. Leonhart, 205 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Ky. 1947); Terry v. Henry, 120 S.W.2d 404,
405 (Ky. 1938).
Nonetheless, strict compliance with the statutes is required in other circumstan-
ces. See, e.g., Gray v. Holbrooks, 247 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. 1952) (failure to execute traverse
bond as required by statute means that the circuit court lacks jurisdiction and must
dismiss the appeal). See note 26 infra and accompanying text. Considering that the
inquisition is held on short notice, requiring the landlord to establish that he is entitled
to possession (by proof or avowal) would appear to be a reasonable safeguard.
KRS § 454.030. But see Glenn, supra note 2, at 29.
, See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Cf.
URLTA, KRS § 383.560(3).
KRS § 383.210(2); accord, Ky. R. Crv. P. 38.04. The demand for a jury may be
made when the case is called for trial. KRS § 383.210(2).
21 The right to a jury trial in a forcible detainer action in Kentucky is a statutory
rather than a constitutional right. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
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the significant changes in the substantive law that are incorpo-
rated in the Uniform Act, it is likely that the right to a jury
trial will become much more important to both parties in a
forcible detainer proceeding.
When the judgment in the quarterly court is in favor of the
landlord, the judge is authorized, after three days, to issue a
warrant of restitution. This warrant directs the sheriff or con-
stable to put the landlord into possession of the premises in
question, by physically removing the tenant and his personal
property if necessary.22 It is possible, however, for the aggrieved
tenant to stay the execution of the judgment while he obtains
a trial de novo in circuit court. To do this, the tenant must file
a traverse before the quarterly court judge 3 and provide a sur-
ety bond.24 Both these requirements must be satisfied within
three days; 5 if they are not, the circuit court is said to lack
jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal. 8
KRS § 383.245. See also 68 Op. ATr'y GEN. 340 (Ky. 1968).
- KRS §§ 383.245, 383.255. This traverse must be filed before the original trial
court, not the circuit court. Allen v. Caldwell, 209 S.W.2d 712 (Ky. 1948). The traverse
is the sole and exclusive remedy of the aggrieved party in a forcible detainer action; it
is not possible to obtain a new trial in the lower court. Chapman v. Baker, 226 S.W.2d
769, 770 (Ky. 1950).
24 KRS § 383.255.
2 Chapman v. Baker, 226 S.W.2d 769 (Ky. 1950). The day of judgment is counted
as the first day. Only judicial days, i.e., days when court is in session, are counted. Id.
28 Gray v. Holbrooks, 247 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. 1952); Mayhew v. Kentucky River Coal
Corp., 38 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Ky. 1931). This view is consistent with the idea that the
special statutory procedures must be strictly followed. See note 17 supra.
Nonetheless, the bond requirement effectively deprives indigent tenants of their
right to appeal. On this basis, one circuit court held the traverse bond requirement
unconstitutional as applied to indigents. Hogue v. Edwards, No. 32364 at 8 (Fayette
Cir. Ct., Ky. 1972). This holding, however, was based on the premise that housing is a
"fundamental right." Id. at 5. Contra, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972).
In any event, the constitutionality of the traverse bond is presently being challenged
in a federal district court action. Louisville Courier-Journal, Jan. 25, 1975, § A at 4,
Col. 1.
Functionally, the traverse bond relates only to the stay of execution, not to the
right of appeal. The purpose of the bond is to protect the landlord; the bond is used
to compensate him for any damages or losses he suffers while he is unable to recover
possession if the traverse is not successfully prosecuted by the tenant. KRS § 383.260.
The landlord is entitled to this protection not because the appeal is being taken, but
because he may suffer losses if he is unable to have the lower court judgement executed
and recover possession.
The court in Hogue recognized this distinction and held that if no bond was
provided, the landlord could have the lower court judgment executed during the pen-
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I. TERMINATION: REQUIREMENTS FOR FORCIBLE DETAINER
AcTION BY THE LANDLORD
The Uniform Act defines the exclusive methods by which
a landlord may recover possession of rental premises. Forcible
detainer (or other "action for possession") is the only author-
ized method in situations where the tenant will not voluntarily
relinquish possession.Y Since the issue to be resolved is which
party is entitled to possession, the action does not lie while the
tenant has the right to present occupancy. Only when the ten-
ancy has terminated, either through natural expiration or by
law, can the landlord successfully maintain a forcible detainer
action.2 Thus, it is necessary to examine the circumstances
that lead to the termination of a rental agreement.
A. Termination Without a Breach by the Tenant
1. Rental Agreements for an Indefinite Term
A landlord may not terminate a rental agreement which is
for a definite period or term until the end of that established
term, unless there has been a material breach by the tenant or
unless there are extraordinary circumstances.9 On the other
hand, if the rental agreement establishes no definite term, a
periodic tenancy is created" and, generally, the landlord may
dency of the appeal. The court reasoned that if the tenant had a valid claim for his
appeal, the landlord would be unlikely to have the judgement executed, as he could
be held liable for wrongful eviction if the tenant was ultimately successful in the circuit
court hearing. Hogue, supra, at 8-9.
Unfortunately, this resolution puts the burden back on the landlord, even though
he has a judgment in his favor. In practice, potential liability for wrongful eviction
would force the landlord to wait, except in those cases where the tenant's claim on
appeal was patently frivolous. Nonetheless, the present statute does prevent an indi-
gent tenant from obtaining a hearing in circuit court, no matter how meritorious his
claim.
1 See notes 6-8 supra and accompanying text.
Is See URLTA, KRS §§ 383.695(4), 383.685. See generally 52A C.J.S. Landlord
and Tenant §§ 766-770 (1968).
"At the end of a tenancy for a definite term, the landlord may bring a forcible
detainer action if the tenant remains in possession. URLTA, KRS § 383.695(4). Of
course, the landlord could insert a provision to provide for early termination. See
Southeastern Land Co. v. Clem, 39 S.W.2d 674 (Ky. 1931).
" "Unless the rental agreement fixes a definite term, the tenancy is week-to-week
in the case of a roomer who pays weekly rent, and in all other cases month-to-month."
1975]
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terminate even if there has been no breach or other cause. For
such periodic tenancies, the only requirement imposed upon
landlords who wish to terminate "without cause" is that they
give sufficient notice of the termination date to the tenant.
The sufficiency of the notice required for a termination
"without cause" depends upon the type of tenancy involved.
For example, written notice must be given at least seven days
in advance in order to terminate a week-to-week tenancy."
Similarly, 30 days written notice is required to terminate a
month-to-month tenancy.32 However, the Uniform Act further
provides that a month-to-month tenancy may be terminated
only at the end of the rental period.33 Apparently, where rent
is payable on the first day of the month, the only date that
could properly be given as the termination date would be the
last day of the month, since this would be the end of the "rental
period." This provision certainly gives uniformity to the law
governing the termination of month-to-month tenancies but,
other than this, the rationale for such a rule is questionable. 4
In any event, a periodic tenancy terminates on the date speci-
fied in the properly given notice to vacate. If the tenant re-
mains in possession after the rental agreement has terminated,
the landlord may institute a forcible detainer action.
URLTA, KRS § 383.565(3) (emphasis added). Previously in Kentucky, all such peri-
odic tenancies were defined as "tenancies at will." See, e.g., Goodwin v. Beutel, 256
S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1953).
31 URLTA, KRS § 383.695(1).
32 URLTA, KRS § 383.695(2).
""The landlord or the tenant may terminate a month-to-month tenancy by a
written notice given to the other at least thirty (30) days before the periodic rental date
specified in the notice." Id. (emphasis added). Accord, Scheidell v. McGregor, 106
S.W.2d 651 (Ky. 1937); Pack v. Feuchtenberger, 22 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1930).
11 It is submitted that this rule may work a hardship on both landlords and
tenants, either of whom may have legitimate reasons for desiring to terminate a ten-
ancy in the middle of a rental period. Furthermore, it is likely that many people are
unaware of the existence of this rule, which may lead to additional hardships. See notes
63-69 infra, and accompanying text.
It has been suggested that this rule serves a useful purpose in that it gives "a
certainty of duration" to periodic tenancies. 2 POWELL, supra note 3, 253. If this was
the desired goal, a 60-day notification period could have been required, as suggested
by the Commissioners. UNIFORm RESIDENTuL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT § 4.301.
1052 [Vol. 63
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2. Destruction or Substantial Impairment of the
Tenant's Use of the Premises
If the dwelling unit or premises are damaged or de-
stroyed by fire or casualty or so injured by the elemefits, act
of God, or other cause to an extent that enjoyment of the
dwelling unit is substantially impaired, the tenant or the
landlord may terminate the rental agreement upon 14 days
written notice; however, the tenant may immediately vacate
the premises."
The above provision of the Uniform Act makes it clear that
a landlord may terminate a rental agreement (for any type of
tenancy) under these extraordinary circumstances even though
there has been no breach by the tenant. Likewise, a landlord
may apparently bring an action for possession in order to com-
ply with local housing codes, where such compliance necessi-
tates demolition or extensive repairs that would "effectively
deprive the tenant of the use of the dwelling unit." 6 Such
provisions are consistent with one major purpose of the Uni-
form Act: to insure that residential housing conforms, at the
very least, to the minimal standards of habitability."
B. Termination Due to a Breach by the Tenant
1. Material Non-Compliance by the Tenant with
Specific Duties Imposed under the Uniform Act
The Uniform Act imposes many specific duties upon a
tenant. The Act further provides that material non-compliance
with some of these statutory duties authorizes the landlord to
terminate the rental agreement." Thus, for example, if a ten-
35 URLTA, KRS § 383.650(1). See also KRS § 383.170; Smith v. Gillen, 245
S.W.2d 596 (Ky. 1952); Sun Ins. Office v. Varble, 46 S.W. 486 (Ky. 1898).
- URLTA, KRS § 383.705(2). This provision is contained in the section dealing
with retaliatory eviction. Nonetheless, its application does not appear to be limited to
the situation where a tenant defends a forcible detainer action on the grounds that the
action is retaliatory in nature.
17 H.B. No. 125 § 2(a) (Ky. 1974) (deleted in final passage). Despite the deletion,
other provisions of the Uniform Act clearly imply the importance of maintaining de-
cent and adequate housing. URLTA, KRS § 383.505(2) (a). Compare URLTA, KRS §
383.595 with URLTA, KRS § 383.605 (corresponding obligations of repair and upkeep
on landlords and tenants).
33 There are several remedies available to landlords. See, e.g., URLTA, KRS §
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ant unreasonably prevents the landlord from entering the
dwelling unit for legitimate purposes,3" the landlord has the
right to terminate the rental agreement immediately."
The most important duties imposed upon tenants under
the Uniform Act, however, are those found in Kentucky Re-
vised Statutes § 383.605. Under this provision a tenant must:
comply with all obligatioins of local housing codes that are pri-
marily imposed upon tenants; keep that part of the premises
that he occupies in a reasonably clean and safe condition; dis-
pose of all waste in a clean and safe manner; keep all plumbing
fixtures that he uses reasonably clean; use all facilities and
applicances in the premises in a reasonable manner; exercise
care so as not to damage or destroy any part of the premises or
knowingly permit any person to do so; and regulate his conduct
and that of his guests so as not to disturb his neighbor's peace-
ful enjoyment of the premises. Where the tenant has materially
breached one of these duties, the landlord may give written
notice specifying the nature of the breach and informing the
tenant that the rental agreement will terminate in 14 days.4'
The tenant then has those 14 days to adequately remedy the
breach, either by repair, payment of damages, or otherwise, but
a failure to do so within the time allowed entitles the landlord
to possession.42 Having cured the first breach, if the tenant
commits another material breach of substantially the same
nature within six months, the landlord again has the power to
terminate the rental agreement upon 14 days notice.43 In this
case, however, there is no provision allowing the tenant to
avoid termination by remedying the breach.
Obviously, the tenant is under a duty to pay rent.44
Equally as obvious is the fact that non-payment of rent is the
most frequent basis for a forcible detainer action. It is therefore
383.660(3) (damages). Termination is available only in specified instances.
39 URLTA, KRS § 383.615(1). The landlord's right to enter is defined by URLTA,
KRS §§ 383.615, 383.665, 383.679(2).
40 URLTA, KRS § 383.700(1).
41 URLTA, KRS § 383.660(1).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 URLTA, KRS § 383.565(2). See also TRLTA, KRS § 383.545(10); URLTA,
KRS § 383.665.
[Vol. 631054
COMMENTS
hardly surprising that the drafters of the Uniform Act gave
special consideration to this particular problem. Thus, if the
tenant does not pay his rent when due, the landlord may give
written notice specifying that the rental agreement will termi-
nate in seven days unless payment is made within that time.
If the tenant fails to make payment the rental agreement ter-
minates," and the landlord is entitled to bring an action to
recover possession.
2. Material Non-Compliance by the Tenant with
Specific Duties Imposed by the Rental Agreement
It should be apparent from the preceding section that the
Uniform Act specifically defines and regulates many of the
rights and duties of both landlords and tenants." Nonetheless,
the provisions of the Act are not all-encompassing. Any other
terms and conditions that the parties may wish to provide for
may be incorporated in a rental agreement. This rental agree-
ment may be either written or oral,47 and may include any
terms not prohibited by law.4" Thus, the rental agreement fur-
ther defines the rights and obligations of the parties, and its
provisions are binding on both the landlord and the tenant.
Where there has been material non-compliance by the ten-
ant with a term of the rental agreement, the landlord may
terminate the tenancy upon 14 days written notice, unless the
tenant adequately remedies the breach within that time.49
Again, if a similar breach occurs within six months, the land-
lord has the absolute right to terminate after giving notice. To
's URLTA, KRS § 383.660(2).
" URLTA, KRS § 383.530.
URLTA, KRS § 383.545(11). The rental agreement similarly includes rules and
regulations adopted by the landlord. Id. These rules and regulations are defined in
URLTA, KRS § 383.610. See also Southland Dev. Corp. v. Ehrler's Dairy, Inc., 468
S.W.2d 284, 287 (Ky. 1971).
"8 URLTA, KRS § 383.565(1). Prohibited terms include: waivers of rights; confes-
sion of judgment clauses; agreements to pay the attorney's fees of the landlord; and
exculpatory clauses. URLTA, KRS § 383.570(1). Likewise the rental agreement may
not permit the landlord to receive rent free of his statutory obligations of repair and
upkeep. URLTA, KRS § 383.575. These prohibitions may be meaningless. See notes
80-85 infra and accompanying text.
4URLTA, KRS § 383.660(1).
5o Id.
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illustrate, the Uniform Act provides that, unless otherwise
agreed, a tenant is to occupy his dwelling unit only as a dwell-
ing unit.5 ' No remedy is specifically given to the landlord under
the Act for a breach of this obligation. The rental agreement,
however, could provide that use of the premises by the tenant
for any unauthorized purpose would be grounds for termina-
tion. A material breach of this covenant, then, would allow
the landlord to notify and terminate in the manner outlined
above.
III. TENANT'S DEFENSES TO FORCIBLE DETAINER ACTION
The Uniform Act provides a dissatisfied tenant with many
rights and remedies that were not available at common law.2
Generally, however, a tenant must follow the explicit proce-
dures and methods set out in the Act before he can avail him-
self of these rights and remedies.13 In some instances, a failure
to follow these procedural requirements may also prevent a
tenant from asserting certain otherwise legitimate defenses.
The defenses available to a tenant under the Uniform Act
arise from three sources. First, several defenses are expressly
provided for in the Act. Others necessarily arise by implication
from specific provisions of the Act. Finally, some defenses, such
as fraud or misrepresentation, are made available by virtue of
the provision which incorporates "principles of law and equity"
to supplement the Uniform Act.54 Regardless of how they arise,
however, defenses to forcible detainer proceedings may be
viewed in terms of public policy. In other words, these defenses
are upheld where it would not be in the public interest to allow
the landlord to recover possession. Public policy may require
that the tenant be protected in some instances, or it may re-
quire that the landlord be "punished" for certain acts or
omissions." With these considerations in mind, this comment
5, URLTA, KRS § 383.620. This provision, however, may be altered by agreement.
52 See generally the authorities cited in note 11, supra.
See, e.g., URLTA, KRS § 383.640(4) ("Rights of the tenant under this section
do not arise until he has given notice to the landlord . .
See URLTA, KRS § 383.510.
It must also be recognized, however, that a successful defense may be almost
meaningless in the case of a tenant from month-to-month. Generally, the landlord can
give notice to terminate "without cause" at any time, perhaps immediately after he
1056 [Vol. 63
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will now focus on several of the more important defenses avail-
able.
A. Dispute Over Grounds for Termination:
Materiality of Breach
Naturally, where the landlord's ground for a forcible
detainer action is a breach by the tenant, the tenant may de-
fend by denying the landlord's allegation. Similarly, the tenant
could maintain, that, although there was a breach, someone
else was responsible. The burden of proof in such a case, in-
deed, in all forcible detainer actions, is on the landlord.
This burden of proof, however, goes beyond proving the
occurrence of any breach; the landlord must prove that a mate-
rial breach has occurred." This is a substantial change from the
common law rule that any breach could lead to a forfeiture of
the right to possession if so provided in a written lease. 57 In
order to avoid the often harsh results of this common law rule,
courts developed a number of doctrines, all of which imple-
mented the well-known maxim, "The law abhors a forfei-
ture."5 Under the Uniform Act it is no longer necessary for a
tenant to rely on a "court of equity" for relief from a forfeiture
incurred by an insignificant breach. While the landlord may be
able to recover damages or obtain injunctive relief for any
breach,59 he can recover possession only where there has been
a material breach.
B. Improper Notice
As previously discussed, the Uniform Act generally re-
unsuccessfully prosecutes a forcible detainer action. In this case, a successful defense
may merely provide the tenant with additional time to relocate.
URLTA, KRS § 383.660(1).
', See, e.g., Miller Dairy Prods. Co. v. Puryear, 310 S.W.2d 518 (Ky. 1957). On
the other hand, in the absence of a clause in a written lease providing for a forfeiture,
a breach by the tenant would give rise to an action for damages but would not by itself
give the landlord the power to terminate. 2 PowEL, supra note 3, 213(3)(a) at 278-
79; Goodwin v. Beutel, 256 S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1953).
182 POWELL, supra note 3, 231(3)(a). Judicial techniques to avoid forfeitures
include strict construction, waiver, estoppel and the doctrine of substantial perform-
ance. Id. See, e.g., Roberts v. Babb, 137 S.W.2d 1112, 1115 (Ky. 1940); Paducah Home
Oil Co. v. Paxton, 2 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Ky. 1928).
5, URLTA, KRS § 383.660(3).
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quires a landlord to give notice of his intention to terminate the
rental agreement.60 Therefore, a landlord's failure to give the
requisite notice would be a valid defense in a forcible detainer
action." Similarly, the Uniform Act provides that, where the
reason for the intended termination is a breach by the tenant,
the notice must specify the particular breach involved. This
enables the tenant to remedy his breach if possible and thus
avoid termination. 2 If the notice fails to specify the reason for
the intended termination, and the tenant is thereby unable to
remedy his breach, the landlord should be precluded from re-
covering possession.
A third aspect of the notice requirements raises an impor-
tant question. Notice must be given a specified number of days
in advance of the termination date. For example, in order to
terminate a month-to-month tenancy "without cause," the
landlord must so notify the tenant at least 30 days before the
specified periodic rental date.13 Consider the case of a month-
to-month tenancy where rent is payable on the first of the
month. The landlord, unaware of the above rule, gives the ten-
ant notice on March 15 that the rental agreement will termi-
nate in 30 days, on April 15. The tenancy will not terminate
on April 15, however, because this date is in the middle, rather
than at the end of the rental period. The crucial issue in this
situation is whether the notice, as given, will serve to terminate
the rental agreement on April 30, the first permissible termina-
tion date that occurs after 30 days.64
Under the common-law rule in Kentucky, improper or in-
sufficient notice is totally invalid; it has no legal significance
- URLTA, KRS §§ 383.650, 383.660(1). There are two exceptions to the require-
ment that the landlord give notice'of termination. URLTA, KRS § 383.695(4)
(holdover after expiration of a tenancy for a definite term); URLTA, KRS § 383.700(1)
(refusal to allow lawful access).
6, Accord, Goodwin v. Beutel, 256 S.W.2d 532, 533 (Ky. 1953).
62 URLTA, KRS § 383.660(1). The opportunity to remedy is available only for the
first breach of a particular nature within a six-month period. Id. See also URLTA, KRS
§ 383.660(2) (non-payment of rent).
URLTA, KRS § 383.695(2). See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
6, There is no doubt that the rental agreement would terminate on April 30 if the
landlord had properly specified this date in the notice given. A similar issue would
arise, for example, where the landlord mistakenly gave termination notice 10 days in
advance instead of 14 as required.
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and, thus, will not terminate a tenancy at any time . 5 In the
above situation, the landlord would be required to give notice
of termination all over again. If he did not learn of his mistake
until the middle of April, the earliest date that could properly
be set for the termination would be May 30, because this is the
end of a rental period that is at least 30 days removed.
This common law rule is unduly technical and should be
re-examined. It would seem that the notice requirements are
designed, first of all, to inform the tenant of the intended ter-
mination and, further, to allow the tenant a reasonable period
of time so that he may remedy a breach if possible or find new
housing if necessary.66 In the hypothetical posed above, both of
these purposes are accomplished, although the notice is techni-
cally improper. First, the tenant is informed of the landlord's
intention to terminate the rental agreement." In addition, if
the improper notice is given legal effect (i.e., if the tenancy
does terminate on April 30) the tenant still receives more than
the required 30-day period to take whatever action is neces-
sary. Thus, there is no apparent justification for the complete
invalidation of technically defective notice in such a situa-
tion.68
If the notice fails to accomplish either of the two purposes
suggested above, the tenant should have a valid defense to a
forcible detainer action. As long as both of these purposes are
achieved, however, the landlord should be allowed to recover
6 Schiedell v. McGregor, 106 S.W.2d 651 (Ky. 1937); Pack v. Feuchtenberger, 22
S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1929).
"1 See Pack v. Feuchtenberger, 22 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Ky. 1929). Professor Powell
suggests that notice is required so that termination of periodic tenancies will not be
made abruptly. 2 POWELL, supra note 3, 253 at 377. This policy stems in part from
the recognition that the tenant may have difficulty finding new accommodations with
the present housing shortage. Id., 225[2] at 232.3.
- URLTA, KRS § 383.560(1) provides that a person has notice of a fact if: (a) he
has actual knowledge of it; (b) he has received notice or notification of it; or (c) from
all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question he has reason to
know that it exists.
Thus, even though the tenant may initially have been given an incorrect date, he
is nonetheless put on notice of the landlord's intention to terminate.
u The common-law rule appears to be premised on the notion that, as a matter
of law, notice specifying an improper termination date would never accomplish the
desired purposes. See Pack v. Feuchtenberger, 22 S.W.2d 914, 916-17 (Ky. 1929).
Under the Uniform Act, however, this would appear to be treated as an issue of fact.
See URLTA, KRS § 383.560(1).
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possession. A mere technical defect in the notice, which does
not mislead the tenant or impair his rights, should not serve
as a valid defense to a forcible detainer action. 9
C. Waiver and Estoppel
Acceptance of rent with knowledge of a default by the
tenant or acceptance of performance by him that varies from
the terms of the rental agreement constitutes a waiver of the
landlord's right to terminate the rental agreement for that
breach, unless otherwise agreed after the breach has oc-
curred."
The doctrine of waiver precludes a lessor from initially
tolerating certain behavior and, thereafter, changing his mind
and attempting to terminate the rental agreement on the basis
of that behavior.71 As drafted, however, the above provision has
raised an important question of interpretation. In several situa-
tions, a tenant is given a period of time in which to remedy a
breach. The issue arises as to whether the landlord can accept
rent before this "grace period" has elapsed without waiving his
right to terminate in the event the remedy is not made.7 2
If the doctrine of waiver applies in this situation, the land-
lord would have to wait to see whether the breach was remedied
before he could collect any rent. Once the landlord accepted
rent, the tenant could not be dispossessed if he failed or even
if he willfully refused to remedy his breach. It is unlikely that
this was the result intended by the drafters. On the other hand,
if the doctrine of waiver does not apply to the acceptance of
rent during the "grace period," the landlord would be able to
accept rent on the assumption that the breach will be reme-
died. If the remedy is made within the time allowed there will
be no termination without regard to the doctrine of waiver. If
the tenant fails to remedy his breach within this time, however,
6, The mistake, of course, must have been made in "good faith." URLTA, KRS §
383.550.
,0 URLTA, KRS § 383.675.
7 2 POWELL, supra note 3, 250 at 372.128-.130.
72 This question was raised in Report, Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act, 8 REAL PROP. PROB. & Th. J. 104, 121 (1973). The Report recommended a
revision of this provision. Id., at n.82.
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the landlord should have the right to terminate even though he
has accepted rent.73
Once the "grace period" has elapsed, or in a case where the
tenant is not given an opportunity to remedy, it would seem
that acceptance of rent by the landlord would, indeed, consti-
tute a waiver. A distinction must be drawn, however, between
acceptance of rent for past occupancy and acceptance of rent
for future occupancy. A landlord does not waive his right to
terminate by accepting rent for past occupancy. 74 For example,
a landlord seeking to terminate a rental agreement on March
1 would be entitled to collect the rent for the month of Febru-
ary, since this rent is due whether the landlord terminates or
not. On the other hand, if the landlord accepts the rent for the
entire month of March (future rent) with knowledge of the
breach, he has waived his right to terminate for that breach.75
The waiver of the right to terminate for a particular breach
in the past, however, does not bar the landlord's right to termi-
nate for a subsequent breach." Past acceptance of improper
performance, or prior leniency, does not estop the landlord
from terminating for a current breach of a similar nature. This
rule, developed at common law, 77 appears to be equally appro-
priate under the Uniform Act. The essence of the doctrine of
estoppel is a reliance by one party on the acts or conduct of
another.78 Under the Uniform Act, a landlord must give notice
of an intended termination, which, in turn, gives the tenant an
opportunity to remedy a breach. The notice itself manifests the
landlord's intention not to permit or accept improper perform-
"' Id. To reach this result, one would have to conclude that the landlord has no
"right to terminate" while the tenant has an opportunity to remedy his breach. Alter-
natively, one could argue that the tenant is not in "default" until the grace period has
elapsed.
11 Daily v. Kelly, 200 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Ky. 1946); Cleve v. Mazzoni, 45 S.W. 88
(Ky. 1898). "Acceptance of unpaid rent after expiration of a termination notice does
not constitute a waiver of the termination." UNiFoRM REsIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TEN-
ANT AcT § 4.204, Comment (emphasis added). Although the Commissioners did not
make a distinction, it is presumed that "unpaid rent" means rent for past occupancy.
11 Daily v. Kelly, 200 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Ky. 1946); cf. Bridges v. Jeffrey, 437
S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1968).
" UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT § 4.204, Comment.
7 See, e.g., Miller Dairy Prods. v. Puryear, 310 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Ky. 1957).
11 See generally 31 C.J.S. Estoppel (1964).
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ance, even if he has done so in the past. Thus, a tenant could
not reasonably rely on past acquiescence by the landlord in the
face of an express notice to the contrary.79 Estoppel, in this
sense then, will not serve as a valid defense in a forcible detai-
ner action."
D. Unconscionability
Under the Uniform Act, courts may refuse to enforce un-
conscionable rental agreements or specific provisions thereof,
or may limit the application of unconscionable provisions to
avoid an unconscionable result.8 It seems clear that when a
landlord brings a forcible detainer action based on a breach of
a provision that is found by the-court to be unconscionable, the
court should not allow the landlord to recover possession.82 On
the other hand, where the rental agreement contains an un-
conscionable provision that is totally unrelated to the tenant's
breach, it appears that the court would be justified in allowing
the landlord to regain possession. 3
7, See Annot. 31 A.L.R.2d 321, 326 (1953). A problem may arise, however, with
respect to nonpayment of rent. Under the Uniform Act, rent is due on the agreed date
without notice or demand. URLTA, KRS § 383.565(2). Nonetheless, if rent is not paid
the landlord must give written notice demanding payment within seven days before
he can terminate the rental agreement. URLTA, KRS § 383.660(2). It is submitted
that many landlords will routinely mail these demand notices on the due date-not to
be able to terminate the rental agreement, but, rather, to encourage prompt payment.
In such a case, if the landlord regularly accepts rental payments after the seven day
"grace" period, thereby establishing a course of conduct, he should thereafter be es-
topped from terminating for a subsequent default. In these circumstances, it would be
reasonable for the tenant to rely on the past conduct of the landlord. The demand
notices never manifested an actual intention on the part of the landlord to terminate
if he did not receive proper performance. The landlord, therefore, should be estopped
until he unequivocally informs the tenant that late payments, although permitted in
the past, will no longer be accepted. See Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 321, 376 (1953). Cf.
RESTATEMENT OF CoiNTRACrS § 300 (1932); Fox v. Grange, 103 N.E. 576 (Ill. 1913).
80 The term "estoppel" is used in a variety of contexts. See BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 648-51 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). Estoppel may, indeed, be a valid defense to a
forcible detainer action in some of the other contexts in which it is used. See URLTA,
KRS § 383.510; Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Ward, 51 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1932) (land-
lord estopped to declare a forfeiture after he stood by and allowed tenant to make
improvements).
81 URLTA, KRS § 383.555(1)(a).
2 Id. See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comments 1, 2 (1962).
8Id.
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Nonetheless, it is likely that some landlords will intention-
ally include unconscionable provisions in rental agreements, as
well as provisions that are specifically prohibited. These provi-
sions will be included without the hope of judicial enforcement,
but for the sole purpose of coercing naive tenants into submis-
sion and forfeiture of their rights.84 Such conduct on the part
of landlords clearly falls within the Uniform Act's definition of
unconscionability, which refers to "any act or conduct which
is willful and is so harsh and unjust as would be condemned or
considered to be wrongful and would be shocking to the
conscience of honest and fairminded persons."" Where such
conduct can be established, courts should consider allowing the
tenant to remain in possession. 6
E. Retaliatory Eviction
A tenant may not be evicted simply because he has com-
plained to a governmental agency concerning a housing code
violation that the landlord is under a duty to repair, or merely
because he has complained to the landlord about a breach of
the landlord's statutorily imposed duties under the Uniform
Act. 7 In a forcible detainer proceeding, evidence of such a com-
91 Tenants may indeed believe that all provisions in a "legal document" are valid.
Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their Leases: An Emprical Study, 69 MICH. L. REv.
247 (1970).
In an effort to avoid this problem, the Commissioners provided for the recovery
of punitive damages from landlords who willfully include terms in rental agreements
that are specifically prohibited (in addition to the provision making such terms unen-
forceable). UNIFORM RESMENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT § 1.403(b) and Comment.
This provision does not appear in the Kentucky version of the Uniform Act. Query
whether a tenant could recover damages in such a case despite the deletion on the
ground that the landlord had violated his obligation of good faith under URLTA, KRS
§ 383.550. The Act provides that all rights and obligations are "enforceable by action
unless the provision declaring it specifies a different and limited effect." URLTA, KRS
§ 383.520(2).
U URLTA, KRS § 383.545(16). Thus, unconscionability under the Uniform Act
corresponds to the equitable doctrine of "unclean hands."
" URLTA, KRS § 383.555(1)(a) does not limit the power of a court to uphold
unconscionability as a defense to a forcible detainer action. This section specifies
remedies for dealing with unconscionable provisions. The section does not limit the
power of a court to grant judicial relief for unconscionable conduct. Such power is
available through URLTA, KRS § 383.510 (principles of equity supplement the provi-
sions of the Uniform Act).
URLTA, KRS §§ 383.705(1)(a), (b). Similarly, a landlord may not evict a
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plaint raises a presumption that the eviction is retaliatory in
nature.88 This presumption is rebuttable, however, and the
landlord can recover possession if he can prove that the termi-
nation is not in retaliation for the tenant's complaint, but is
justified by other reasons, such as a breach by the tenant or the
need to make extensive repairs.89 The defense of retaliatory
eviction recognizes the importance of encouraging tenants to
report needed repairs to their landlords or to housing authori-
ties. There is a strong public interest in developing and main-
taining decent and adequate housing;9" certainly this defense
will promote that interest.
F. Breach by the Landlord as a Defense to
Non-payment of Rent
When the landlord brings a forcible detainer action based
upon non-payment of rent, the tenant is allowed to counter-
claim for any damages that he is entitled to recover under the
rental agreement or the Uniform Act.9" In this event, the court
may order the tenant to pay into court all or a part of the rental
payments due, or that become due during litigation, to be held
in escrow. The court then determines the net amount due to
either party. This amount is paid, to the extent possible, from
tenant merely because he has joined a tenant's union. URLTA, KRS § 383.705(1)(c).
URLTA, KRS § 383.705(2).
URLTA, KRS 99 383.705 (2), (3).
,o Inadequate housing often leads to crime, disease and other social problems
which necessitate expenditure of public funds. H.B. No. 125 § 2(a) (Ky. 1974) (deleted
in final passage). See note 40 supra. See also Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409, 413
(Wis. 1961).
Query, however, as to how long the policy behind retaliatory eviction allows a
tenant to remain in possession. See URLTA, KRS § 383.705(2).
9, URLTA, KRS § 383.645(1). The tenant apparently may counter-claim for dam-
ages in any forcible detainer action. See URLTA, KRS § 383.545(1). But see URLTA,
KRS § 383.645(2). In any event, only where the landlord's claim for possession is based
on non-payment of rent do these claims constitute a defense.
Except as otherwise provided, "the tenant may recover damages . . . for any
noncompliance by the landlord with the rental agreement of [sic] KRS 383.595."
URLTA, KRS § 383.625(2). The tenant may also recover damages under URLTA, KRS
§9 383.630(1)(b), (2) (failure to deliver possession), 383.640(1)(b), (2) (failure to supply
essential services), 383.655 (same), 383.700 (unlawful or unreasonable entry), and
383.705(2) (retaliatory eviction). The tenant is also entitled to recover his security
deposit if the landlord has not followed the statutory requirements for those deposits.
URLTA, KRS § 383.580(4).
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the escrow account, and any balance must be paid by the party
owing. Payment of the net amount due, if any, to the landlord
entitles the tenant to remain in possession."
This provision represents a substantial change from the
common law. 3 It is interesting to note that the Uniform Act,
which "regulates and determines rights, obligations and reme-
dies"94 of both parties, does not specifically give the tenant the
right to withhold rent as a remedy when the landlord has
breached. The tenant's obligation to pay rent is not completely
dependent upon the landlord's adherence to the terms of the
lease or the Act; that is, a breach by the landlord does not
excuse the tenant from paying rent. Nevertheless, this provi-
sion does allow the tenant to get a judicial determination of set-
offs against his obligation to pay rent. The tenant is entitled
to remain in possession if he is willing and able to meet his
obligation to pay the net rental amount due. Moreover, the
tenant need not initiate an action for such a determination; he
may wait until the landlord brings a forcible detainer action
and use this provision as a successful defense. 5
IV. CONCLUSION
The purpose of a forcible detainer action is to determine
which party is entitled to possession of leased premises. Such
a determination necessarily involves a resolution of competing
interests. On the one hand, the landlord is the owner of a prop-
erty interest. Our society generally allows a person to use his
property as he sees fit, subject only to the duties and restric-
"2 URLTA, KRS § 383.645(1). Rent, in this context, would include expenditures
made by the landlord for certain damages done by the tenant. URLTA, KRS § 383.665.
If the tenant's counterclaim is not made in good faith, the landlord may recover
attorney's fees. URLTA, KRS § 383.645(1).
is At common law, a tenant could not withhold rent and affirmatively defend a
forcible detainer action on the basis that the landlord had breached his obligations.
The tenant's obligation to pay rent was completely independent of any obligations on
the landlord. See, e.g., Cox v. Hardy, 371 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. 1963). But see Jackson v.
Pepper Gasoline Co., 133 S.W.2d 91 (Ky. 1939) (lease is a bilateral contract with
mutual promises).
URLTA, KRS § 383.530.
" This provision should give tenants a great deal of leverage to force landlords to
make needed repairs.
" 2 POWELL, supra note 3, 271.
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tions imposed by law. The duties and restrictions imposed
upon landlords should not be harsh or unjust, for the likely
result of such impositions will be a reduction in the flow of
capital into the private housing sector." The inadequacies of
public housing as a means of providing sufficient and suitable
dwelling accommodations" suggest that it is expedient to en-
courage the maintenance and development of private housing.
Thus, it is in the public interest to protect the rights of the
landlord.
Forcible detainer under the Uniform Act provides this pro-
tection for the landlord. The action remains a speedy and effec-
tive means for a lessor to recover possession of rental premises.
The restrictions and conditions placed upon the availability of
the forcible detainer action are neither unreasonable nor diffi-
cult to comply with. In addition, the Uniform Act makes forci-
ble detainer available to landlords in situations where it was
not always available before. Therefore, forcible detainer
under the Uniform Act provides adequate protection for the
property interests of the landlord.
At the same time, however, the summary nature of the
forcible detainer proceeding requires that the rights of the ten-
ant likewise be given adequate protection. The tenant, too, is
the owner of a valuable property interest-the right to present
possession.' °° Although this property right in itself entitles the
tenant to protection, the average residential tenant is not par-
ticularly impressed by the fact that he is the owner of an estate
in land. He is more interested in being able to live in decent
and adequate housing.'0 ' Substandard housing often leads to a
g1 Gibbons, Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: A Survey of Modem Problems
with Reference to the Proposed Model Code, 21 HAsT. L.J. 369, 415 (1970). See also
Note, The Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 655 (1970).
Is See generally Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54 CAL.
L. REV. 642 (1966); Schier, Protecting the Interests of the Indigent Tenant: Two
Appoaches, 54 CAL. L. Rav. 670 (1966).
11 For example, the Uniform Act permits any landlord to terminate a rental agree-
ment if rent is not paid within 7 days after a demand notice is given. URLTA, KRS §
383.660(2). At common law, however, non-payment of rent did not give the landlord
the right to terminate unless there was a specific stipulation in the lease to that effect.
Goodwin v. Beutel, 256 S.W.2d 532, 533 (Ky. 1953). See note 57 supra and accompany-
ing text.
100 Glenn, supra note 2, at 27-28 and authorities cited therein.
0I Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See
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variety of social problems that require substantial expenditures
of public funds.' 2 Thus, public policy requires that the tenant's
interest be protected. Several defenses to forcible detainer pro-
ceedings under the Uniform Act, such as the defense to retalia-
tory eviction, are based on a recognition of the importance of
this interest.
Furthermore, an eviction often entails more than mere
removal from a dwelling with all the attendant disruptions this
can cause. From the tenant's point of view, an eviction may
entail the loss of a "home."'' 3 At the very least, the tenant
deserves fair treatment when the loss of his home is at stake.
The Uniform Act provides fairness in the eviction procedure,
as evidenced by the notice requirements and the doctrine of
waiver, and thus offers protection to the tenant in a forcible
detainer action.
On this basis, it would seem that forcible detainer under
the Uniform Act does an adequate job of balancing the compet-
ing interests of landlords and tenants. There are, of course,
some particular aspects of the procedure and the governing law
that are open to criticism, but these problems can be easily
resolved by the courts and the legislature. Hopefully, the
foregoing discussion will serve to spur efforts in that direction
and to promote an understanding of forcible detainer under the
Unform Act which will ensure just and proper results in the
resolution of conflicts between landlords and tenants.
Thomas H. Watson
also, e.g., Green v. Sumiski, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Marini v. Ireland,
265 A.2d 526 (N.J. 1970).
'" Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409 (Wis. 1961).
113 Lindsey v. Nornet, 405 U.S. 56, 82 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The idea that a tenant has some "interest" beyond the mere right to present
possession is implicit in the provisions of the Uniform Act and in the cases cited in
the preceeding footnotes. If this were not the case, there would be no need to allow
the tenant to "affirmatively" defend in a forcible detainer action. He could be ade-
quately protected by an action for damages after the landlord recovered possession.
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